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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joseph J. Hillenbrand appeals from his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine).

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The facts underlying Hillenbrand’s conviction for possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine) are based on the following testimony and evidence
presented by the state at trial.
At the time of trial, Nampa Police Officer Brad Childers had been in law
enforcement for ten years and had been a certified canine handler for over seven years.
(Tr., p.88, L.23 – p.89, L.16.) During the previous six months, Officer Childers had
employed his certified drug detection dog, Arturias, to sniff for drugs (marijuana, cocaine,
heroin, and methamphetamine) hundreds of times. (Tr., p.90, L.15 - p.92, L.5.) On the
evening of February 27, 2017, Officer Childers was working patrol and assisting another
officer when he conducted a traffic stop of a sedan-style car which had a taillight out; the
driver was Hillenbrand and he had a front seat passenger, Chad Zubieta. (Tr., p.88, Ls.811; p.92, L.17 – p.93, L.20; p.113, L.25 – p.114, L.2; p.116, Ls.2-12.)
Officer Childers asked Hillenbrand for his driver’s license, registration, and proof
of insurance, and Hillenbrand provided his driver’s license and continued to look for the
other two documents in the glove box and on the floor, and appeared to become more
nervous. (Tr., p.93, L.21 – p.94, L.-11.) The officer told Hillenbrand to stay in his vehicle
and continue to look for the items while he returned to his patrol car. (Tr., p.94, Ls.11-14.)
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When he walked to his patrol car, Officer Childers noticed another officer had arrived at
the scene. (Tr., p.94, Ls.16-17.)
Due to Hillenbrand’s increasing level of nervousness, Officer Childers told
Hillenbrand that he was going to run his canine around his vehicle. (Tr., p.94, Ls.17-24.)
When the officer asked Hillenbrand if there were any drugs in the car, Hillenbrand said
there were not, but his nervousness became greater, and he “was stuttering and extremely
nervous” at that time. (Tr., p.95, L.12 - p. 96, L.2.) Officer Childers told Hillenbrand to
stay in his car, and after asking Officer Schouman to conduct driver’s status and warrant
checks, he “got Arturious [sic] out of [his] patrol car and conducted what [they] call a freeair sniff around the outside of the vehicle.” (Tr., p.96, Ls.4-13.) Arturias “immediately
had a change of behavior at the driver’s door and then began sniffing heavily along the
seam – the bottom seam of the door and alerted by sitting.” (Tr., p.97, Ls.1-3.) The officer
told Hillenbrand to remain in the vehicle and advised Officer Schouman that they were
going to be searching the vehicle because of the canine alert. (Tr., p.97, Ls.8-12.)
Officer Childers informed Hillenbrand that his “canine had alerted on the vehicle
and that [they] were going to be searching it and to step out.” (Tr., p.98, Ls.1-3.)
Hillenbrand became upset and reluctant to get out of the car – he “became very frantic”
and said “no,” and (the officer believed) he started crying while “digging frantically
underneath his seat.” (Tr., p.97, L.20 – p.98, L.8; p.129, Ls.18-23; p.130, Ls.17-19.) The
state admitted a short CD video from Officer Childers’ body-cam, which, according to the
officer, showed Hillenbrand reaching under his seat. (Tr., p.106, L.18 – p.107, L.17.) For
his own safety, and while Officer Schouman was present, Officer Childers immediately
opened Hillenbrand’s door, “grabbed a hold of him and told him to step out.” (Tr., p.98,
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L.17 – p.99, L.7.) Officer Childers, who had “a clear line of sight to the passenger and the
defendant[,]” then checked to see what the passenger was doing, and he was complying to
commands by keeping his hands on the dashboard the whole time the officer saw him. (Tr.,
p.99, L.19 - p.100, L.5.) The officer testified that the passenger and Hillenbrand had not
changed their positions and the passenger “was compliant with everything. He seemed to
be very calm about the whole incident.” (Tr., p.99, Ls.22-25; p.127, Ls.8-12.)
Officer Childers testified that Hillenbrand continued to disobey his orders as he
persisted in digging underneath his seat: “he was moving papers around and either reaching
for something or digging further under there. I grabbed his arm and told him to step out
again at which time he did.” (Tr., p.100, Ls.6-15.) The officer asked Hillenbrand to walk
to the rear of the vehicle, but Hillenbrand “wanted to stay near his door of his vehicle.”
(Tr., p.100, Ls.17-18.) Officer Childers asked Hillenbrand several times to calm down and
walk to the rear of vehicle, and after several requests, Hillenbrand complied. (Tr., p.100,
Ls.19-21.) A pat down search of Hillenbrand did not result in the discovery of any illegal
drugs or weapons. (Tr., p.100, L.21 – p.101, L.4.)
Officer Childers had a clear view as he watched Officer Schouman search
Hillenbrand’s vehicle. (Tr., p.101, Ls.10-14; p.132, Ls.11-14.) Officer Childers observed
Officer Schouman discover “a white – or a clear plastic baggie from underneath” the
driver’s seat. (Tr., p.101, Ls. 15-21; p.134, Ls.4-14.) Officer Childers was shown the
baggie at the scene, and testified at trial that the “item” inside it was a “white crystal
substance[,]” which, based on his training and experience, he suspected to be

3

methamphetamine due to its consistency. 1 (Tr., p.102, L.1 – p.103, L.8.) Another officer
at the scene, Officer Coronado, conducted a field test on the contents of the baggie and
Hillenbrand was taken into custody; the passenger was released. 2 (Tr., p.103, Ls. 16-21.)
No other items of contraband were discovered during the officer’s search of the
vehicle. 3 (Tr., p.103, L.22 – p.104, L.7.) However, Hillenbrand stated that some clothing
found in the back seat of the vehicle was his. (Tr., p.104, Ls.8-11.) With regard to the
clear baggie with a white crystal substance (State’s Exhibit 2), Officer Childers testified
that he brought the evidence seized from Hillenbrand’s vehicle to court, and that the log
for it showed “it was submitted by Officer Coronado into evidence and then while in
evidence, it was opened up and tested and then brought back to the lab, retaped there.”
(Tr., p.108, L.25 – p.109, L.3; see generally Tr., p.107, L.21 - p.110, L.7.)
Nampa Police Officer Josh Schouman confirmed much of Officer Childers’
testimony. He testified that after he arrived at the scene, he stood at the passenger side of
the car for “scene security” while Officer Childers contacted the driver. (Tr., p.146, Ls.3-

1

After being Mirandized by Officer Childers, Hillenbrand indicated that he understood
his rights. (Tr., p.102, Ls.3-7.) Hillenbrand denied that the white crystal substance was
his and said that he does not use drugs and that he did not know the clear plastic baggie
was “there.” (Tr., p.103, Ls.10-15; p.164, Ls.5-15.)
2

Officer Coronado testified that he took the small baggie with the white crystal substance
to the police department, where he tested it “with a NIK test kit.” (Tr., p.171, L.19 – p.
172, L.4.)
3

Officer Childers testified that Officer Schouman also found a metal container with a clear
top that contained a larger crystal substance which Hillenbrand said were bath salts
“literally for taking baths”; that substance did not “end up being any sort of controlled
substance.” (Tr., p.104, Ls.8-17; p.134, L.15 – p.135, L.19; p.152, Ls.13-22.)
4

7.) After Officer Childers gave Officer Schouman two identification cards 4 to “run” for
warrants and driver’s license checks, Officer Childers “deployed his State-certified canine”
around the car. (Tr., p.146, Ls.14-23.) While Officer Schouman was conducting those
checks, Officer Childers said that the canine had alerted and that he was going to ask the
driver and passenger to get out of the car. (Tr., p.146, L.20 – p.147, L.4.) Officer
Schouman approached the car on the driver’s side with Officer Childers. (Tr., p.147, Ls.69.) Officer Childers asked Hillenbrand to get out of the car, Hillenbrand “made like a
lunging or jerking movement with his hands in the direction of the seat he was sitting in.”
(Tr., p.148, Ls.17-21.) Officer Schouman commanded Hillenbrand to “not make any
lunging movements, to not reach for – underneath the seat and essentially just told him to
stop whatever he was doing.” (Tr., p.149, Ls.5-10.) Officer Childers then opened the car
door and had Hillenbrand get out, although Hillenbrand paused and was “not really
listening to what [the officers] were saying.” (Tr., p.149, Ls.15-23.) Hillenbrand seemed
frantic and paranoid, and after he got out of his car, the officers escorted him away from
the car so they “could just get him away from whatever was or wasn’t in the car . . . for
safety reasons and concerns.” (Tr., p.149, L.24 – p.150, L.13.)
After Hillenbrand was safely removed from his car, Officer Schouman searched it
and found a “small like clear ziploc baggie” with “a white crystal-like substance in it” that
was under the driver’s seat leaning against the track closest to the driver’s side door that
the seat sits on. (Tr., p.151, L.5 - p.152, L.10; p.163, Ls.14-19.) Nampa Police Officer
Michael Coronado assisted at the scene by staying with Hillenbrand and the passenger
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The identification cards given to Officer Schouman were Hillenbrand’s driver’s license
and the passenger’s identification card. (Tr., p.156, Ls.1-12.)
5

while the car search was conducted, and later transported the small baggie with the white
crystal substance to the police department and placed it into evidence. (Tr., p.170, L.21 –
p.171, L.6.) After packaging the evidence and filling out the documentation on the
evidence envelope, the evidence was “routed to the ISP Lab . . . by the evidence employee.”
(Tr., p.180, Ls.2-14.)
Over Hillenbrand’s objection (based on an alleged late witness disclosure), the state
called Nampa Police Officer Heath Otto to testify. (Tr., p.200, L.22 – p.201, L.7.) Officer
Otto testified that when he arrived at the scene of the traffic stop, he initially spoke to
Officer Childers and “made a passenger side approach” and stayed on the passenger side
of the stopped car. (Tr., p.203, Ls.2-11.) Officer Otto had an “unobstructed view of the
passenger” the “whole time that [he was] standing by the passenger side.” (Tr., p.203,
Ls.12-17; p.205, Ls.2-4.) The officer “stood by there until Officer Childers went to go get
his State-certified dog to perform an exterior sniff of the vehicle[,]” after which the officer
“stayed on the passenger side” of the car. (Tr., p.203, Ls.18-23.) Officers Childers and
Schouman then approached the car from the driver’s side, and the officers “instructed both
parties to exit the vehicle at that point.” (Tr., p.203, Ls.23-25.) Officer Otto explained that
the driver kept “reaching in his lap or underneath on the floorboard,” and at one point the
officer “drew [his] pistol and instructed the passenger . . . to place his hands on the dash[,]”
which he did. (Tr., p.204, Ls.1-8.) Once the passenger put his hands on the dash, he was
compliant, and the entire time Hillenbrand was being removed from the car, Officer Otto
stood by the passenger side of the car while the passenger had his hands on the dashboard.
(Tr., p.204, L.12 – p.205, L.1.)
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Corinna Owsley, a forensic scientist in the drug chemistry section of the Idaho State
Police Forensic Services, testified that she followed the approved procedures for analyzing
substances for methamphetamine, and opined that one of the plastic baggies that was in
State’s Exhibit 2 contained methamphetamine. (Tr., p.181, Ls.5-13; p.185, L.18 – p.189,
L.9.)
The state charged Hillenbrand with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) (R., pp.24-25), and a jury convicted him of that offense (R., pp.43, 48,
51). The district court sentenced Hillenbrand to a unified term of three years, with one
year fixed, all suspended, and placed him on probation for three years. (R., pp.51-54.)
Hillenbrand timely appealed. (R., pp.55-58.)
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ISSUES
Hillenbrand states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err by allowing Officer Childers to testify that only
ten percent of drivers get as nervous as Mr. Hillenbrand when asked
about drugs, and that almost all of them in fact had drugs, because that
testimony lacked a proper foundation and was not relevant?
2. Because the State never disclosed Officer Otto as a witness, did the
district court abuse its discretion by allowing him to testify?
3. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Hillenbrand’s motion for a
mistrial after Officer Otto testified that the State had charged him with
a felony?
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Hillenbrand
to complete one-hundred and fifty hours of community service?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Hillenbrand failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting Officer Childers’ testimony that, when asked about drugs, only ten percent of
the drivers he stops become as nervous as Hillenbrand, and of that ten percent, almost all
have drugs?
2.
Has Hillenbrand failed to establish that the state did not disclose Officer Otto as a
witness, and even if the state did not timely disclose Officer Otto as a witness, has
Hillenbrand failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing him to
testify?
3.
Has Hillenbrand failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his
motion for a mistrial based on Officer Otto’s testimony that the charge against him was a
felony?
4.
Has Hillenbrand failed to establish that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion by ordering him to complete 150 community service hours?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Hillenbrand Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Admitting Officer Childers’ Testimony That, When Asked About Drugs, Only Ten
Percent Of The Drivers He Stops Become As Nervous As Hillenbrand, And Of That Ten
Percent, Almost All Have Drugs
A.

Introduction
On cross-examination, Officer Childers testified that during the previous six

months, he had come into contact with hundreds of people in “traffic stop situation[s]”
similar to Hillenbrand’s. (Tr., p.119, Ls.17-20.) When asked by defense counsel if he
would “agree that an individual can become typically nervous when suddenly asked about
something like drugs,” he answered, “[t]he majority of people that I speak with, I would –
if I were to give you a number if that’s what you’re wanting, 80 percent do not get that
nervous about it.” (Tr., p.120, Ls.1-7.) That testimony was not objected to in any way.
On re-direct examination, Officer Childers’ testimony continued as follows:
[PROSECUTOR]:
Q Okay. Now, you stated that there was -- let’s talk a little bit about
nervousness during the investigation. Okay. So in this case, you stated that
he was particularly nervous.
A Yes.
Q And one of the questions the defense attorney asked you was
what percentage of people become nervous when you ask them about drugs.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Misstates the question.
COURT: I’ll allow it. Go ahead and answer.
WITNESS: Most people become somewhat nervous about it but they don’t
get a heightened nervous about it. I’ll ask 90 percent of the people that I
conduct a traffic stop with depending on their answers of where they’re
coming and going from.
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[PROSECUTOR]:
Q Could you expand on that just a little bit? So what percentage
becomes extra nervous when you ask them about drugs?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Foundation. Relevance.
[PROSECUTOR]: She opened the door, Your Honor.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I never asked a question about percentage.
COURT: I’ll go ahead and allow the question. It’s overruled.
WITNESS: Maybe 10 percent of the people get that nervous about it.
[PROSECUTOR]:
Q And of that 10 percent of people based on your training and
experience as a field officer, how much do you find drugs?
A Of the percentage, almost all of them.
(Tr., p.139, L.20 – p.141, L.1.)
On appeal, Hillenbrand contends the district court abused its discretion by allowing
Officer Childers to testify to two opinions: (a) when asked about drugs, only ten percent
of the drivers he encounters become as nervous as Hillenbrand, and (b) almost all of that
ten percent in fact had drugs. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.) Hillenbrand argues that Officer
Childers’ testimony should not have been admitted because it did not meet the foundation
requirements under I.R.E. 702 (testimony by expert witnesses), and was not relevant. (Id.)
Hillenbrand’s argument fails.
First, Hillenbrand argues for the first time on appeal that both opinions by Officer
Childers were inadmissible under I.R.E. 702. Because that argument was not made to the
trial court, it has not been preserved and should not be considered on appeal. Second,
although the trial court did not specifically state its reasons for overruling Hillenbrand’s
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objection to Officer Childers’ first opinion (i.e., “maybe 10 percent”), its admission of that
statement should be affirmed because (1) as the prosecutor argued, Hillenbrand opened the
door to it, and (2) it related to facts within the officer’s personal knowledge. See I.R.E.
701 (opinion testimony by lay witnesses); State v. Allen, 156 Idaho 332, 336, 325 P.3d
673, 677 (Ct. App. 2014) (a correct ruling entered on an erroneous basis will be affirmed
on the correct legal basis); but see State v. Hoskins, ___ P.3d ___, 2018 WL 4169337 (Ct.
App. Aug. 31, 2018) (not final) (state’s alternative theory on appeal of suppression case
not preserved under rationale of State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 396 P.3d 700
(2017) and its progeny). Even if the district court erred in admitting Officer Childers’ first
opinion, such error was harmless. Third, in addition to not being preserved, the second
opinion by Officer Childers (i.e., of the ten percent, “almost all of them” have drugs) was
not objected to at trial. Because Hillenbrand has failed to allege, much less show,
fundamental error in the admission of that second opinion, that issue cannot be considered
on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its judgment

will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Perry,
139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).

Specifically, whether sufficient

foundation has been laid for the admission of evidence is committed to the discretion of
the trial court. State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 81, 190 P.3d 896, 900 (Ct. App. 2008). Absent
an abuse of that discretion, the decision to admit opinion evidence will not be disturbed on
appeal. State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 1993). “The
question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo[.]” State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho
11

200, 202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006) (citing State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945
P.2d 1, 3 (1997)).

C.

The District Court Properly Admitted Officer Childers’ Testimony That, When
Asked About Drugs, Only Ten Percent Of The Drivers He Stops Become As
Nervous As Hillenbrand
1.

Hillenbrand’s Appellate Claim That Officer Childers’ Testimony Was
Inadmissible Under I.R.E. 702 Is Not Preserved

On appeal Hillenbrand asserts the district court erred by allowing Officer Childers
to testify that, after being asked about drugs, “maybe 10 percent” of persons he stops appear
as nervous as Hillenbrand – his “first opinion.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.) Hillenbrand
only argues that the officer’s testimony should have been ruled inadmissible as expert
opinion testimony under I.R.E. 702. 5 (Id.) Hillenbrand’s appellate argument fails because
it is not preserved for appellate review.
“For an objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground
for the objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent from
the context.” Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 473, 299 P.3d 781, 785 (2013) (internal
quotation omitted). A “broad, general objection” is generally insufficient to preserve a
more precise appellate claim of error. Id. at 474, 299 P.3d at 786. Thus, for example, an
objection that “no proper foundation has been laid” is not sufficiently specific because it

5

Hillenbrand also argues that, under I.R.E. 702, Officer Childers’ second opinion – that,
when asked about drugs, of the 10 percent of those traffic stop subjects that get as nervous
as he did, “almost all of them” have drugs – was inadmissible. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.711; see Tr., p.140, L.23 – p.141, L.1.) However, Hillenbrand did not object to the officer’s
second opinion at all; therefore, as explained in section E, infra, that testimony can only be
challenged if it meets the fundamental error test, which it does not.
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does not state “wherein the foundation for the opinion was insufficient.” Ballard v. Kerr,
160 Idaho 674, 692, 378 P.3d 464, 482 (2016) (internal quotation omitted).
Review of the record shows that Hillenbrand objected to the question on the basis
of non-specified “[f]oundation” and “[r]elevance,” to which the district court simply stated,
“I’ll go ahead and allow the question. It’s overruled.” 6 (Tr., p.140, Ls.11-19.) The court
was never asked to rule on whether Officer Childers’ testimony was admissible under
I.R.E. 702 as expert opinion testimony; no mention of Rule 702 was made at all in regard
to the officer’s testimony.
Hillenbrand makes no attempt to show how such a nondescript objection preserved
his appellate argument that the trial court erred by not ruling that, under I.R.E. 702, the first
opinion by Officer Childers was inadmissible, i.e., that he was not qualified as an expert
because he was not shown to have “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”
that would assist the jury. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.) Because a general objection to
foundation and relevance does not preserve a specific objection that an opinion does not
qualify as an expert opinion under I.R.E. 702, Hillenbrand has failed to show that his
appellate issue is preserved. See Roberts, 154 Idaho at 473, 299 P.3d at 785.
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection may only
be considered on appeal if it “constitutes fundamental error.” State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho
259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). Therefore, under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010), review of this issue will not lie unless (1) the defendant

6

Between the objection and the district court’s ruling, the parties very briefly argued about
whether defense counsel had previously opened the door for Officer Childers to testify
about the percentage of people who, after being asked about drugs, become as nervous as
Hillenbrand. (Tr., p.140, Ls.15-17.)
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demonstrates that “one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were
violated”; (2) the constitutional error is “clear or obvious” on the record, “without the need
for any additional information” including information “as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision”; and (3) the “defendant must demonstrate that the error affected
the defendant’s substantial rights,” generally by showing a reasonable probability that the
error “affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.”
Hillenbrand has not presented any argument that the admission of Officer Childers’
first opinion qualifies as fundamental error. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.) Even if he
had, the fundamental error analysis does not apply to the unobjected to testimony because
fundamental error only applies to unwaived constitutional claims, not evidentiary issues.
See State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 182, 254 P.3d 77, 83 (Ct. App. 2011). Therefore, this
Court should not consider Hillenbrand’s argument that the trial court erred by admitting
Officer Childers’ testimony that “maybe 10 percent” of people get as nervous as
Hillenbrand during traffic stops after being asked about drugs. (See Tr., p.140, Ls.11-21.)

2.

Hillenbrand Opened The Door To Officer Childers’ Testimony

As detailed above, when the prosecutor asked Officer Childers on re-direct, “[s]o
what percentage becomes extra nervous when you ask them about drugs?” Hillenbrand
objected based on “[f]oundation” and “[r]elevance.”

(Tr., p.140, Ls.11-14.)

The

prosecutor then argued that Hillenbrand “opened the door” to the officer’s (first) opinion
during cross-examination, and defense counsel responded, stating she “never asked a
question about percentage.”

(Tr., p.140, Ls.15-17.)

The district court overruled

Hillenbrand’s objection without explanation. (Tr., p.140, Ls.18-19.) A review of the
record shows that Hillenbrand opened the door for the officer to testify about the
14

percentage of persons who, in similar situations, exhibit the same level of nervousness as
Hillenbrand. See State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho 346, 350, 883 P.2d 704, 708 (Ct. App. 1994)
(defense counsel opened the door for prosecutor to ask witness for explanation of what
“theatrical” meant).
During Officer Childers’ cross-examination, when asked by defense counsel if he
would “agree that an individual can become typically nervous when suddenly asked about
something like drugs,” he answered, without any objection, “[t]he majority of people that
I speak with, I would – if I were to give you a number if that’s what you’re wanting, 80
percent do not get that nervous about it.” (Tr., p.120, Ls.1-7.) By stopping midway in his
answer to ask defense counsel, “if I were to give you a number if that’s what you’re
wanting” (id.), Officer Childers indicated that he believed defense counsel’s question may
have asked for a numerical comparison between those who do, and those who do not, get
as nervous as Hillenbrand when asked about drugs. Additionally, his answer asked defense
counsel if giving “a number” is “what you’re wanting,” and counsel made no attempt to
steer him away from answering her question in a numerical way.
In sum, even though Hillenbrand’s trial counsel did not specifically request Officer
Childers to compare Hillenbrand’s level of nervousness to others in terms of “percentage,”
counsel’s question and non-response to the officer’s query (i.e., “if that’s what you’re
wanting”) reasonably opened the door for the officer to opine on Hillenbrand’s level of
nervousness in comparison to others. The fact that the officer used a “percentage” to make
that comparison was not outside the scope of counsel’s question.

Therefore, the

prosecutor’s question on re-direct about what percentage of people exhibit the same level
of nervousness as Hillenbrand was a subject previously opened by Hillenbrand.
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3.

Officer Childers’ Testimony Was Admissible Under I.R.E. 701 – Opinion
Testimony By A Lay Witness

Apart from foundation and relevance, Hillenbrand did not state any other
evidentiary ground for objecting to the prosecutor’s question about “what percentage
becomes extra nervous when you ask them about drugs?” (Tr., p.140, Ls.11-13.) After
the district court generically overruled that objection, the officer answered, “[m]aybe 10
percent of the people get that nervous about it.” (Tr., p.140, Ls.19-21.)
On appeal, Hillenbrand argues that Officer Childers’ testimony that “maybe 10
percent” of people get as nervous as Hillenbrand when asked about drugs should have been
ruled inadmissible because it “was nothing but a not unbiased guess masquerading as
statistical fact” (Appellant’s Brief, p.11), and failed to meet the foundational requisites for
an expert opinion under I.R.E. 702 (id., pp.7-10). Hillenbrand further contends that a
proper foundation for the officer’s testimony should have included information
“establishing his ability to evaluate nervousness, the parameters he uses for determining
the degree of an individual’s nervousness, how he documents that nervousness, when he
last reviewed that documentation, how large of a data set he relied upon to arrive at the
percentages, and so on.” (Id., p.10.)
Despite Hillenbrand’s focus on I.R.E. 702, the district court correctly overruled his
objection to the question to Officer Childers about what percentage of people, when asked
about drugs, get as nervous as Hillenbrand. Even though the court did not mention I.R.E.
701 in regard to the officer’s testimony, the court’s ruling should be affirmed on the correct
basis that such testimony falls squarely within the scope of admissible opinion testimony
by a layman under that rule. See Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677; but see Hoskins,
___ P.3d ____, 2018 WL 4169337.
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Lay opinion testimony which is based on a matter within the witness’s personal
knowledge and helpful to a determination of a fact in issue is generally admissible.
Enyeart, 123 Idaho at 454, 849 P.2d at 127. Lay opinion testimony is governed by Idaho
Rule of Evidence 701, which provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the witness in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the
determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
I.R.E. 701.
Officer Childers testified that he had been in law enforcement for over ten years,
and had been a canine handler for over seven years. 7 (Tr., p.89, Ls. 3-6.) He testified that,
in the six months prior to trial, he and his certified drug detection canine, Arturias, had
hundreds of contacts with people in which Arturias had engaged in smells for drugs – four
of five times a night while on patrol. (Tr., p.90, Ls.15-16; p.91, L.24 – p.92, L.5.) Officer
Childers was certainly qualified, as any normal layman would be, to opine on the apparent
level of “nervousness” Hillenbrand and others exhibited during traffic stops after being
asked about drugs.
Drawing from the language of I.R.E. 701, Officer Childers’ opinion was “rationally
based” on his perception as a witness during those contacts. See I.R.E. 701. The fact that
Officer Childers had conducted hundreds of traffic stops during the previous six months
and could compare Hillenbrand’s level of nervousness with hundreds of others “was

7

Officer Childers has an advanced certificate from P.O.S.T., a drug recognition
certification, and certifications as a canine handler and SWAT team operator. (Tr., p.88,
L.12 – p.89, L.16.)
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helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony” he gave about how extraordinarily
nervous Hillenbrand appeared to be. See id. In short, this is the very sort of testimony that
is contemplated by Rule 701. See State v. Goerig, 121 Idaho 108, 111-12, 822 P.2d 1005,
1008-09 (Ct. App. 1991) (officer’s lay opinion that field sobriety tests he personally
conducted were 95% accurate compared with breathalyzer, blood, and urine tests
admissible under Rule 701); Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 892, 749 P.2d 1012, 1017
(Ct. App. 1988) (lay witness’s testimony approximating her speed at between 20 and 25
miles per hour admissible under Rule 701); Enyeart, 123 Idaho at 454, 849 P.2d at 127
(testimony from EMT with personal knowledge of the effects of LSD that defendant was
under the influence of LSD admissible under Rule 701).
Hillenbrand has failed to show that Officer Childers’ estimate of the percentage of
motorists he encounters who get as nervous as he did is so esoteric as to require “technical
or other specialized knowledge” under I.R.E. 702 that would not permit the officer who
personally has conducted hundreds of traffic stops to merely opine that, when asked about
drugs, only about ten percent get as nervous as Hillenbrand. Although not the district
court’s stated basis for its ruling, this testimony was properly admitted under Rule 701.
See Allen, 156 Idaho at 336, 325 P.3d at 677. The district court was therefore correct to
allow that testimony to go to the jury for them to determine what weight and credibility to
give to it. That exercise of the district court’s discretion should be affirmed.

4.

Any Error Was Harmless

Even if the issue is preserved, and even if the district court erred, Hillenbrand is not
entitled to a new trial. “A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionallybased error shall have the duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the
18

State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010). “[T]he error is
harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the same without the error.” State v.
Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 44, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (citing State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013)). Even if the district court erred by admitting Officer
Childers’ testimony that only ten percent of those he stops become as nervous as
Hillenbrand when asked about drugs, review of the record establishes that admitting the
challenged testimony was harmless.
There is no reasonable possibility that Officer Childers’ first opinion might have
contributed to Hillenbrand’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine, because the
evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. The state relies upon the facts set forth in its
Statement of Facts, supra, to show that any error is harmless. Additionally, before the
officer gave the challenged testimony, the jury had already heard him testify – without any
objection – that 80 percent of those contacted through traffic stops do not get as nervous
as Hillenbrand – leaving 20 percent that do. (Tr., p.119, L.17 – p.120, L.7.) Although the
officer later opined that “maybe 10 percent” of people contacted through traffic stops act
as nervous as Hillenbrand, the difference between that challenged opinion (maybe 10
percent) and his earlier unchallenged opinion (20 percent) is insignificant, and would not
have made any difference in the outcome of the trial. This is especially true considering
that Hillenbrand testified at trial about how his anxiety disorder caused him to get nervous
during stressful situations, and that his nervousness affected his speech and breathing. (See
Tr., p.212, L.2 – p.213, L.10; p.220, Ls.2-7; p.221, Ls.8-21; p.224, Ls.7-11; p.233, L.25 –
p.234, L.2.)
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In short, the jury would have reached the same result absent the challenged
testimony because the evidence establishing Hillenbrand’s guilt was overwhelming, the
officer’s first opinion testimony was only a small part of the case against Hillenbrand, and
he admitted that his anxiety caused him to become what can only be described as unusually
nervous in stressful situations. There can be no reasonable doubt that the jury would have
reached the same result without the admission of Officer Childers’ challenged testimony.
Any error is therefore harmless and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

D.

Hillenbrand Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error In Officer Childers’
Testimony That, Of The Ten Percent Of Drivers Who Get As Nervous As
Hillenbrand When Asked About Drugs, Almost All Of Them Had Drugs
On appeal, Hillenbrand challenges the admission of the two separate opinions by

Officer Childers together – as if they had both been objected to. (See generally Appellant’s
Brief, pp.7-11.) Although Hillenbrand objected to the officer’s first opinion, he failed to
object to the second opinion, as follows:
[Prosecutor]: And of that 10 percent of people based on your training and
experience as a field officer, how much do you find drugs?
[Officer Childers]: Of the percentage, almost all of them.
(Tr., p.140, L.23 – p.141, L.1.) No objection was made to either the prosecutor’s question
or the officer’s answer.
As discussed, a claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely
objection may only be considered on appeal if it “constitutes fundamental error.” Johnson,
149 Idaho at 265, 233 P.3d at 196. Under Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978,
Hillenbrand’s challenge to the admission of Officer Childers’ second opinion cannot be
reviewed unless he demonstrates that (1) “one or more” of his unwaived constitutional
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rights were violated; (2) the constitutional error is “clear or obvious” on the record,
“without the need for any additional information” including information “as to whether the
failure to object was a tactical decision”; and (3) the error affected his “substantial rights,”
generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error “affected the outcome of the
trial court proceedings.”
Hillenbrand has not argued on appeal that Officer Childers’ second opinion (i.e.,
“almost all of them”) qualifies as fundamental error. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.)
Moreover, the fundamental error analysis does not apply to the unobjected to testimony
because fundamental error only applies to unwaived constitutional claims, not evidentiary
issues. See Norton, 151 Idaho at 182, 254 P.3d at 83. Therefore, this Court should not
consider Hillenbrand’s argument that the trial court erred by admitting 8 Officer Childers’
testimony that, of the ten percent of people who get as nervous as Hillenbrand during traffic
stops after being asked about drugs, almost all of them have drugs.
Even if this Court considers Hillenbrand’s argument and determines that, under
I.R.E. 702, Officer Childers’ opinion testimony should have been precluded, any error
would be harmless for the same reasons set forth in section C-4, supra, which are relied
upon here.

8

Because Hillenbrand failed to object to Officer Childers’ second opinion, the trial court
did not specifically rule on its admissibility; it is more accurate to say that the trial court
did not sua sponte preclude such testimony.
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II.
Hillenbrand Has Failed To Establish That The State Did Not Disclose Officer Otto As A
Witness; Even If The State Did Not Timely Disclose Officer Otto As A Witness,
Hillenbrand Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In
Allowing Him To Testify
A.

Introduction
Hillenbrand contends the district court abused its discretion by permitting Officer

Otto to testify at trial because he was not disclosed as a witness. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.1115.) However, in its four responses to Hillenbrand’s discovery request, the state effectively
disclosed Officer Otto as a potential witness at trial. Even if this Court concludes
otherwise, Hillenbrand has failed to meet his burden of showing the claimed late disclosure
affected his ability to prepare for trial or to present a defense. Therefore, Hillenbrand has
failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion and committed reversible error
when it permitted Officer Otto to testify.

B.

Standard Of Review
When an issue of late disclosure of prosecution evidence is presented, the inquiry

on appeal is whether the lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced the defendant’s preparation
or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving a fair trial. State v.
Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995); State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726,
728, 979 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389, 924 P.2d
1230, 1233 (Ct. App. 1996). The defendant bears the burden of establishing prejudice by
showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for the late disclosure of evidence, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Pacheco, 134 Idaho 367, 370,
2 P.3d 752, 755 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Spradlin, 119 Idaho 1030, 1034, 812 P.2d 744,
748 (Ct. App. 1991). On appeal from the district court’s order denying relief from an
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alleged prejudice resulting from the state’s late disclosure of evidence, appellate courts
review the trial court record to see if there was substantial and competent evidence to
support a finding of no unfair prejudice. State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592-93, 977
P.2d 203, 206-07 (1999).

C.

Hillenbrand Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In
Allowing Officer Otto To Testify
When the prosecutor called her last witness, Officer Otto, defense counsel objected

and the parties approached the bench, where defense counsel said, “[t]his is a witness that
is disclosed in discovery but it wasn’t disclosed in the State’s witness list that they
submitted so we’d object to him testifying.” (Tr., p.200, L.22 – p.201, L.5 (emphasis
added).) The court trial court responded, “Okay, I’ll overrule that. Go ahead and call him.”
(Tr., p.201, Ls.6-7.) Officer Otto proceeded to testify. (Tr., p.201, L.14 – p.206, L.7.)
As an initial point, the fact that Hillenbrand’s trial counsel stated that “this is a
witness that is disclosed in discovery” is a concession that Officer Otto was, in fact,
disclosed as a witness, albeit through discovery instead of the witness list. Inasmuch as
Hillenbrand is bound by that concession, he cannot now claim that the state failed to
disclose through discovery that Officer Otto was a potential witness. See, e.g., State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721, 404 P.3d 659, 663 (2017) (parties on appeal are held to
concessions made in the trial court).
Review of the state’s discovery responses shows that, as Hillenbrand’s trial counsel
conceded, Officer Otto was “a witness that [was] disclosed in discovery[,]” although he
was not listed in the state’s “witness list.” On March 2, 17, and 23 of 2017, the state filed
responses to Hillenbrand’s discovery request, each listing in paragraph “2” the names of
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“State Witnesses” within a line-box, none of which named Officer Otto. (Aug., pp.4-6, 1823.) 9 Immediately below the “state witnesses” box, all three responses stated, “ANY
OTHER WITNESS LISTED IN THE REPORTS[.]” (Aug., pp.5, 19, 22 (emphasis
original).)
On August 24, 2017, the state filed a “Witness List – Exhibit List” which itemized
four officers as witnesses it intended “to use at jury trial[,]” but did not include Officer
Otto. (Aug., pp.58-59.) However, on August 31, 2017, the day jury trial began, the state
served the Canyon County Public Defender 10 a fourth discovery response that listed four
witnesses in the “state witnesses,” but not Officer Otto. (Aug., pp.101-103.) However,
that fourth response included, as did the prior responses, the statement, “ANY OTHER
WITNESS LISTED IN THE REPORTS” under section “2” entitled “State Witnesses.”
(Aug., p.102 (emphasis original).)
Officer Otto was, in fact, listed in several police reports and the probable cause
affidavit. (See Presentence Report (“PSI), p.44 (listing Officer Otto as a responding
officer); p.47 (describing Officer Otto’s arrival at the scene and transporting Hillenbrand
to jail); p.52 (Officer Coronado named Officer Otto as one of three officers he saw talking
to two subjects upon his arrival); pp.60-63 (dispatch calls by Officer Otto listed on Call
Detail Report); R., pp.13-14 (Officer Otto named twice in probable cause affidavit).)
Moreover, the police reports included Officer Otto’s own report of his role during the

9

On June 22, 2018, this Court granted Hillenbrand’s Motion to Augment the Record with
24 documents. Documents contained in that augmentation will be cited to “Aug.”
10

Service of all four of the state’s responses to discovery was accomplished by placing a
true and correct copy of the documents “in the Shared Drive //ccfilepub/Discovery/PA to
PD.” (Aug., pp.6, 20, 23, 103.)
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traffic stop of Hillenbrand. (PSI, pp.54-55.) Having been informed in four separate
discovery responses that “any other witness in the reports” could be called as “state
witnesses,” Hillenbrand was informed that Officer Otto could be called as a witness at trial.
Although Officer Otto’s name was left off the “Witness List – Exhibit List” filed August
24, 2017 (Aug., pp.58-59), the state’s subsequent (fourth) discovery response reiterated
that anyone “listed in the reports” could be called to testify at trial. (Aug., p.102.)
In sum, not only was Officer Otto’s participation in Hillenbrand’s traffic stop
through arrest disclosed to Hillenbrand through discovery, he was also notified four times
that Officer Otto could be called by the state to testify at trial.
Even if the state failed to provide adequate notice that Officer Otto was a potential
trial witnesses, such failure was harmless. When Hillenbrand’s trial counsel objected to
Officer Otto testifying, she said he “is disclosed in discovery but it wasn’t disclosed in the
State’s witness list that they submitted so we’d object to him testifying.” (Tr., p.201, Ls.35.) Hillenbrand’s attorney did not say that she was surprised by the officer being called as
a witness, nor did she request more time to prepare for his testimony or any other sanction.
Instead, she appears to have objected because he was not named in the “Witness List –
Exhibit List” – not because she did not know about Officer Otto’s role in the case or that
he was a potential trial witness. (See id.)
Officer Otto’s police report stated, “I took up a position on the passenger side so I
could watch the driver and passenger, while Officer Childers made a driver side contact
with the driver. . . . While Officer Childers was walking back to his vehicle, I could see
the driver, who would later be identified as Joseph J. Hillenbrand (09-10-1964), continue
to reach underneath his leg in his lap area, as well as on the floorboard of the vehicle.”
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(PSI, p.54.) There was nothing about the officer’s testimony that would have caught
Hillenbrand’s counsel off-guard. By stressing Hillenbrand’s conduct in his report, Officer
Otto implicitly indicated that the passenger’s conduct was not noteworthy.
On appeal, Hillenbrand cites Officer Otto’s testimony about the passenger’s (Mr.
Zubieta) unsuspicious conduct while the officer watched the driver and passenger, stating:
Officer Otto went on to testify that, during the traffic stop at issue,
he stood by the passenger side of the car; after he saw Hillenbrand reach
toward the floorboard, he instructed the passenger, Mr. Zubieta, to keep his
hands on the dashboard and Mr. Zubieta complied; and then he asked Mr.
Zubieta to get out of the car. Officer Otto added that he had an unobstructed
view of Mr. Zubieta, Mr. Zubieta never did anything unusual or suspicious,
and that Mr. Zubieta had his hands on the dash when the officers took Mr.
Hillenbrand out of the car.
(Appellant’s Brief, p.14; see Tr., p.203, L.9 – p. 205, L.4.)
Hillenbrand does not explain how Officer Otto’s testimony about Mr. Zubieta’s
passive role in the incident could have been discredited through cross-examination, or how
the outcome of the trial would have been different, had the state specifically disclosed the
officer as a witness on its witness list. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-15); see Pacheco, 134
Idaho at 370, 2 P.3d at 755; Spradlin, 119 Idaho at 1034, 812 P.2d at 748. Based on the
overwhelming evidence of Hillenbrand’s guilt presented at trial as set forth in the Statement
of Facts, supra, relied upon here, and the above argument, any error was harmless.

III.
Hillenbrand Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His
Motion For A Mistrial Based On Officer Otto’s Testimony That The Charge Against Him
Was A Felony
A.

Introduction
During the last part of Officer Otto’s testimony about his role during the traffic stop

of Hillenbrand, when asked “how did the situation ultimately go?” he answered, “The
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driver was arrested for possession of controlled substance, felony.” (Tr., p.205, Ls.10-12.)
Shortly thereafter, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial
during the following exchange with the court:
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, the last witness indicated that Mr.
Hillenbrand was charged with a felony which is specifically indicating the
nature and punishment of a crime. I feel that although I do not want to, I
have to make a motion for a mistrial because punishment is not something
that the jury should be taking into consideration.
COURT: All right. I’m going to deny that motion. Do you want me to
give a curative instruction that the word “felony” was used and they are to
not take into consideration the word “felony” that was used? That would
seem to be drawing attention to the word several times.
[Defense Counsel]: That’s my concern, Your Honor. For now, I’m going
to say no.
COURT: Okay. All right.
[Defense Counsel]: Thank you though.
COURT: I’m going to deny the request for a mistrial.
(Tr., p.206, L.17 – p.207, L.9.)
On appeal, Hillenbrand contends the district court should have granted his motion
for a mistrial after Officer Otto told the jury that the charge against Hillenbrand was a
felony. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.15-18.) Hillenbrand claims that the statement by the officer
deprived him of a fair trial. (Id.) In light of the evidence presented by the state and the
curative actions offered to Hillenbrand by the district court (although not accepted), the
jury’s verdict was not influenced by the officer’s comment; therefore, Hillenbrand received
a fair trial. Hillenbrand has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion
and committed reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial.
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B.

Standard of Review
The standard for review of a refusal to grant a mistrial is well established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised
his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion
was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial
has been denied in a criminal case, the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard is a
misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error.
Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial
will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.

State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 198, 16 P.3d 288, 295 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v.
Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993) (See also State v. Canelo,
129 Idaho 386, 389, 924 P.2d 1230, 1233 (Ct. App. 1996)). “[The] error will be deemed
harmless if the appellate court is able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was
no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho at 198, 16 P.3d at 295 (citing Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 58, 855
P.2d at 895).

C.

When Viewed In The Context Of The Entire Record, Officer Otto’s Comment That
Hillenbrand’s Charge Was A Felony Did Not Constitute Reversible Error
Hillenbrand claims the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

a mistrial because (a) “referencing a felony in particular signals that the defendant is facing
a rather serious charge” carrying a “certain stigma that can only serve to further prejudice
a defendant[,]” and (b) “[t]o make matters worse, as even the district court recognized, any
instruction about Officer Otto’s use of the term ‘felony’ would only draw more attention
to it and risk further prejudicing Mr. Hillenbrand[,]” and “[t]herefore, the only possible
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remedy was to grant Mr. Hillenbrand’s motion for mistrial.” 11 (Appellant’s Brief, pp.1718.) Acknowledging the impropriety of Officer Otto’s testimony that Hillenbrand was
charged with a felony, his comment does not constitute reversible error when viewed in
the context of the entire record.
Officer Otto’s “felony” reference was made only one time and in passing as he
described the offense Hillenbrand was charged with. (See Tr., p.205, Ls.11-12.) No other
testimony or comment about the crime being a felony was made in front of the jury.
Although Hillenbrand’s counsel opted to not accept the district court’s offer to “give a
curative instruction that the word ‘felony’ was used and they are to not take into
consideration the word ‘felony’ was used[,]” counsel chose what she determined to be the
least prejudicial way to address the problem. See also State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504,
507, 37 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding prosecutor’s references to defendant’s “custody
status” did not affect the outcome of the trial even where the district court did not instruct
the jury to disregard all of the references).
Next, this is not a situation where the jury was effectively informed that Hillenbrand
had any prior criminal record, much less a prior felony. See, e.g., State v. Roy, 127 Idaho
228, 899 P.2d 441 (1995) (court’s references to “felony” in jury instruction during first
phase of DUI trial was harmless error); State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 979 P.2d 128 (Ct.
App. 1999) (harmless error where the court disclosed to the jury that the DUI charge was
a felony); State v. Frederick, 126 Idaho 286, 882 P.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1994) (harmless error
where victim’s mother referred to the defendant’s parole); State v. Fluery, 123 Idaho 9,

11

By Hillenbrand’s reasoning, a mistrial must be declared in every trial in which a witness,
an attorney, or the court, inadvertently mentions in the jury’s presence that the charged
offense is a felony.
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843 P.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1992) (witness’s statement revealed the presence of Fluery’s
probation officer at his arrest). Rather, an attentive juror would have only been informed
that Hillenbrand’s current charge was a felony – for which he had not been convicted and
for which he was presumed to be innocent. (Aug. p.74 (Preliminary Jury Instruction No.
4: “Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent.”).) The
jury was also instructed that (1) it was not to “concern [itself] with the subject of penalty
or punishment. That subject must not in any way affect your verdict” (Aug., p.86), and (2)
the state had to prove all of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (id., p.87).
There is no reason to believe that the jury disregarded these jury instructions due to one
offhand reference to “felony.”

The jury is presumed to follow the district court’s

instructions. State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871, 332 P.3d 767, 783 (2014) (citing State
v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011)).
Lastly, even without Officer Otto’s improper reference to “felony,” the jury’s
verdict would not have been different. The state relies upon its Statement of Facts, supra,
to show that the evidence of Hillenbrand’s guilt was overwhelming. State v. Watkins, 152
Idaho 764, 768, 274 P.3d 1279, 1283 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Ruiz, 159 Idaho 722, 725,
366 P.3d 644, 647 (Ct. App. 2015). Hillenbrand’s frantic and persistent hand movements
under the driver’s seat where the methamphetamine was found, his unusual level of
nervousness, his crying, and Officer Otto’s testimony that he watched the passenger the
entire time he was posted at the passenger-side door, show that he not only knew of the
methamphetamine’s presence, he also had “physical control of,” or “the power and
intention to control it.” (See Aug., p.88 (Jury Instruction No. 13).)
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When viewed in the context of the full record, Hillenbrand was not entitled to a
mistrial. This Court should be able “to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was
no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”
Barcella, 135 Idaho at 198, 16 P.3d at 295 (citing Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 58, 855 P.2d at
895).

IV.
Hillenbrand Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion By Ordering Him To Complete 150 Community Service Hours
A.

Introduction
A jury found Hillenbrand guilty of possession of methamphetamine and the district

court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, suspended the
sentence, and placed Hillenbrand on supervised probation for three years with the condition
that he complete 150 hours of community service on a schedule directed by his probation
officer. (R., pp.51-53.) Hillenbrand asserts the district court abused its discretion by
ordering him to complete 150 hours of community service, instead of the statutory
minimum of 100 hours, because, he alleges, the court improperly considered the
prosecutor’s belated revelation that he had made a derogatory comment to a juror in the
courthouse parking lot after the trial ended. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.18-21.) Hillenbrand
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard

considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d
387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State
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v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of
the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v.
Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits,
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State
v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence is
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.
A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective
of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or
retribution. Id.

C.

Hillenbrand Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing
Discretion
The maximum sentence for possession of methamphetamine is seven years in

prison. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). The district court imposed a unified sentence of only three
years, with one year fixed, suspended with three years of supervised probation, which falls
well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.51-54.) Generally speaking, the condition of
probation that Hillenbrand complete 150 hours of community service instead of 100 hours
is not excessive. However, Hillenbrand argues that, in light of the allegedly improper
reason the court ordered 50 more hours than required, it abused its discretion. (Appellant’s
Brief, pp.18-21.)
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated:
So what we would ask for in this case is public defender
reimbursement for the very fine job that Monica did at trial and we would
ask for community service as is required. However, one of the things that
was brought to my attention after the trial was over is apparently after Mr.
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Hillenbrand passed one of the jurors in the parking lot, he muttered the
words “fucking bitch” and the juror came back and was upset about it
enough to tell the bailiff about this.
And while we don’t condone this sort of behavior, we think that
there out to be some measure for that and so I would ask the Court to ask
for an additional 50 hours of community service on top of the 100 that he
already has to do just basically to make the statement to him that it’s
inappropriate to do that after a trial. That is not the way that we treat our
jurors. They are simply doing the service that they are supposed to do.
(Tr., p.295, L.12 – p.296, L.3.)
Instead of objecting to the district court considering the reported incident the
prosecutor described, Hillenbrand’s counsel said:
Regarding any statement that may have been made to a juror, this is
the first I know of that. Mr. Hillenbrand adamantly denies making that
statement. I can let the Court inquire more of him but I think we have little
information on that and it would be unfair to order additional punishment
of Mr. Hillenbrand for something that we have little evidence of.
(Tr., p.298, Ls.14-20.)
During his comments to the court, Hillenbrand said:
Let me state now, I didn’t approach any juror that day of my trial or
whatever stating anything directed at them in any way. I may have been
upset leaving the courthouse but I didn’t approach anyone that I would even
know that was on the jury so I didn’t talk to anyone that day.
(Tr., p.299, Ls.1-6.)
In its prefacing remarks immediately before sentencing Hillenbrand, the district
court explained:
So you can understand a jury. They don’t come in here voluntarily.
They’re sitting at home one day. They get a letter that says you got to show
up. They don’t want to be here. They don’t know you. They don’t want to
hear all this stuff. They don’t want to spend two days messing around with
this and then if they’re walking out in the parking lot and somebody – this
is the accusation. Somebody calls them a name, that would scare them to
death, you know. That would scare you to death. You think it’s some
retaliation or something.
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(Tr., p.299, Ls.15-24.)
From the above sequence of statements by the prosecutor, defense counsel,
Hillenbrand, and the district court, Hillenbrand contends that (1) the disclosure of the
incident by the prosecutor was untimely (i.e., not until the sentencing hearing), and (2) the
reported of the incident was unreliable because it relied upon multiple layers of hearsay.
Hillenbrand concludes that, because the court apparently ordered him to perform 50
additional community service hours because of the reported incident, it abused its
sentencing discretion. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.18-21.) Even assuming that the district court
increased Hillenbrand’s community service hours from 100 to 150 solely because of the
prosecutor’s rendition of the parking lot incident, it did not abuse its discretion.
First, Hillenbrand’s counsel did not object to the court considering the incident; she
only complained that she was first hearing about the incident at the sentencing hearing, and
that there it would be unfair to “order additional punishment of Mr. Hillenbrand for
something that we have little evidence of.” (Tr., p.298, Ls.14-20.) Hillenbrand’s counsel
did not ask for more time to look into the incident further before her client was sentenced.
Even if the court made a credibility determination as between the hearsay report of
Hillenbrand’s improper comment and Hillenbrand’s denial of any impropriety, it was
entitled to do so. See State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, ___, 407 P.3d 1285, 1288 (2017)
(quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009) (“Decisions
regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and
factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court.”)).
Having apparently concluded that the prosecutor’s information about the parking
lot incident was more credible than Hillenbrand’s denial, the court reasonably increased
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Hillenbrand’s community service hours by 50. In effect, the court determined that since
Hillenbrand interfered with the juror’s performance of his or her jury duty (a type of
community service), it would be appropriate to increase his community service hours from
the statutory minimum of 100 to 150. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Hillenbrand
has failed to establish an abuse of sentencing discretion by ordering him to perform 150
hours of community service.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Hillenbrand’s judgment of
conviction and sentence.
DATED this 13th day of September, 2018.
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